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Equitable Distribution of Military Pensions?




The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act'
(FUSFSPA)2 was passed by Congress in 1982. By the Act,3 Con-
gress intended to eliminate the effects of the 1981 United States
Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 4 which prohibited
states from dividing military pensions 5 as marital property follow-
ing divorce.6 Congress' purpose in enacting FUSFSPA was two-
* J.D. expected 1992, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. expected
1991 in Administrative Services, Northern Michigan University; Magna Cur Laude
A.B. 1987 in History, Harvard University.
1. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(1988), amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510 § 555, 104 Stat. 1485
(1990). The statute as it currently reads, in part, is printed in the Appendix.
2. FUSFSPA is the acronym used primarily by courts in California. It is used
in this article to differentiate between the federal Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act and state statutes which grant former spouses of military
personnel their rights under the federal act.
3. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988), amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
§ 555, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990).
4. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). For a discussion of McCarty, see infra notes 52-57 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of FUSFSPA's purpose, see infra notes 7-8,
100-01, 107, 111-20 and accompanying text.
5. Id. Members of the armed forces are eligible to receive a pension upon re-
tirement from the armed forces provided they have served for a specified period of
time. Generally, a service of 20 years is required before a service member is eligible
to receive a non-disability military retirement pension. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911-3929
(1988) (Army); 10 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6332 (1988) (Navy and Marine Corps); 10 U.S.C.
§§ 8911-8929 (1988) (Air Force).
The amount of military retirement pay is calculated by taking into account
both the length of service and the achieved rank. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3926, 3991 (1988)
(Army); 10 U.S.C. §§ 6325-6327 (1988) (Navy and Marine Corps); 10 U.S.C. § 8929
(1988) (Air Force).
6. Currently, all states (except Alabama), the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Canal Zone recognize or are likely to recognize the division of mili-
tary pensions as marital property upon divorce. Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act Update, Army Lawyer, June 1989, at 43. Even Alabama
courts consider military retired pay in determining alimony obligations. Id. Most
states also permit division of military pensions before they are vested. Id. See, e.g.,
Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1983), overruling Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230
(Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1982) (military retired pay divisible as
Law and Inequality [Vol. 9:315
fold. First, Congress wanted to return the issue of division of
retirement benefits to the states, who are better equipped to deal
with matters of family law.7 Second, Congress felt a need to ad-
dress particular concerns regarding military families.8
A military family moves as often as every twelve to twenty-
four months.9 Military spouses also tend to be responsible for
marital property upon divorce); DeGryse v. DeGryse, 135 Ariz. 335, 661 P.2d 185
(1983); Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d
592, 517 P.2d 449, 11 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974); Gallo v. Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1988)
(vested military retired pay is divisible); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140
(1987) (court "[a]ssum[ed] that vested and unvested military retirement benefits ac-
quired during the marriage are . . . marital property subject to equitable divi-
sion .... "); Linson v. Linson, 1 Haw. App. 272, 618 P.2d 748 (1981); In re Dooley, 137
Ill. App. 3d 401, 484 N.E.2d 894 (1985); In re Howell, 434 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1989);
Jones v. Jones, 680 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1984); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La.
1975); Lunt v. Lunt, 522 A.2d 1317 (Me. 1987); Nisos v. Nisos, 60 Md. App. 368, 483
A.2d 97 (1984) (application of Md. Farn. Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b)(1984), providing
that military pensions are to be treated in the same manner as other pension bene-
fits, and that such benefits are marital property under Maryland law); McGinn v.
McGinn, 126 Mich. App. 689, 337 N.W.2d 632 (1983); Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347
N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Powers v. Powers, 465 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1985);
Coates v. Coates, 650 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of Kecskes, 210
Mont. 479, 683 P.2d 478 (1984); Taylor v. Taylor, 217 Neb. 409, 348 N.W.2d 887; Cas-
tiglioni v. Castiglioni, 192 N.J. Super. 594, 471 A.2d 809 (1984); Walentowski v.
Walentowski, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657 (1983); Lydick v. Lydick, 130 A.D.2d 915,
516 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (suggests military retired benefits divisible);
Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1984); Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Ohio
App. 3d 194, 468 N.E.2d 784 (1984); Stokes v. Stokes, 738 P.2d 1346 (Okla. 1987); In
re Manners, 68 Or. App. 896, 683 P.2d 134 (1984); Major v. Major, 359 Pa. Super. 344,
518 A.2d 1267 (1986) (marital property includes nonvested military retired pay);
Martin v. Martin, 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (vested military
retirement benefits are divisible); Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982);
Konzen v. Konzen, 103 Wash. 2d 470, 693 P.2d 97, cert denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985);
Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 Wis. 2d 424, 367 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Parker v.
Parker, 750 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 1988) (marital property includes nonvested military re-
tired pay); Bodenhorn v. Bodenhorn, 567 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1978) (military retired
pay divisible in the Canal Zone); but see Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 102 Nev. 652, 729
P.2d 1363 (1986) (court notes FUSFSPA but declines to divide retired pay in post-
divorce situation involving a decree from a foreign jurisdiction).
7. [W]e should allow the State domestic courts to make all divorce deci-
sions. If we do not adopt this amendment, we are in effect taking the
position that the Federal Government is going to make final determi-
nations on what type of judgments come out of divorce courts. I will
tell you, that is going to open up a lot of problems and it will be a can
of worms.
128 Cong. Rec. 18,334 (July 28, 1982) (statement of Rep. Hance).
8. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1555, 1570.
9. Legislation Related to Benefits for Former Spouse of a Military Retiree:
Hearings on HR 2817, HR 3677, and HR 6270 Before the Military Compensation
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1982) [herein-
after House Hearings]; see also 128 Cong. Rec. 18,328 (July 28, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Mitchell) (military families move as many as 10 to 12 moves in a 20-year
career).
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larger than average families.10 Consequently, upon divorce, for-
mer military spouses are less able to make up the loss of support
from a military pension. As a result of their frequent relocation
and child-bearing patterns, they are also less likely to have access
to substantial non-pension marital property," their own social se-
curity, or private retirement pensions.1 2 In addition, former
spouses have little ability to apply the political pressures which
might safeguard their rights. Military wives are a highly diverse
group of individuals, unified only by their marital status, and
therefore politically fragmented and geographically isolated from
similarly situated former spouses.
The problem is compounded when one considers the lack of
alternatives to "self support," such as earned wages and pension
rights of their own, available to military spouses. As of 1983, only
13.9 percent of divorced women received an alimony award, and
the mean amount received was only $3,980.13
Former military spouses do not fare particularly well when it
comes to enjoying an income level adequate to meet their needs.
A member poll conducted by Ex-Partners of Servicemen/Women
for Equality (EX-POSE)14 found that the majority of former
spouses responding had a monthly income from all sources of less
than $1100.15 The survey showed that 23 percent of EX-POSE's
10. More than 2,900,000 spouses and children of active duty military members
exist today and 1,500,000 more are dependents of the military reserves. H.R.J. Res.
566, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 10,349 (1990). In fact, dependents now out-
number military service numbers. Id Gaye Mansell (Forbes) is a striking example
of this trend among military families: she was married to Gerald E. Mansell (the
military retiree) for 23 years, and they were the parents of six children. Mansell v.
Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Valley, 97 Or. App. 95, 775 P.2d 332 (1989). The
parties in that case were frequently relocated and therefore never acquired a home.
The district court's McCarty-era decree, which was reversed on appeal, awarded the
wife $8,000 in marital property while the husband retained a $100,000 military pen-
sion. Id at 333.
12. See irnfra notes 132-154 and accompanying text.
13. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Series P-23, No. 141, Child
Support and Alimony: 1983, Current Population Reports 4 (1985).
14. Headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, "EX-POSE is a non-profit, volun-
teer organization dedicated to achieving equity for the ex-wives of servicemen ..."
Although they work on behalf of all former spouses, EX-POSE is especially con-
cerned with "the older woman whose primary career in her long-term marriage
was that of military wife and homemaker." What is EX-POSE?, EX-POSE Mem-
bership Application (copy on file with Law & Inequality). Twenty-five percent of
EX-POSE's members responded to the poll. EX-POSE newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 4. The federal government does not gather or maintain official statistics concern-
ing the number of former spouses of military personnel or the average pension
awards to former spouses.
15. EX-POSE newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 4 (membership survey conducted
July-Aug. 1988) (copy on file with Law & Inequality).
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members live at or below the poverty line.16
FUSFSPA, however, contains loopholes17 which permit re-
tired service personnel to unilaterally exclude retirement income
from divisible assets. The most damaging of these loopholes is the
exclusion of the Veteran's Administration disability pension.' 8
This disability pension offsets, rather than augments, a portion of
the retirement income, 19 and its exclusion from marital property
was solidified in 1989 in Mansell v. Mansell.20 The Mansell deci-
sion has drastic consequences for former spouses of military per-
sonnel. As a result of Mansell, former spouses of military
personnel are now eligible for less than the statutorily authorized
50 percent of the military spouse's pension.2 1
16. Id.
17. A number of expenses are excluded from the statutory definition of dispos-
able retired pay. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 555, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990). See supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
18. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-510, § 555, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990).
19. Generally, a military retiree may receive disability payments only to the ex-
tent that he or she waives a corresponding amount of his or her retirement pay. 38
U.S.C. § 3105 (1988). For example, if a military retiree is eligible for $1500 per
month in retirement pay, and $300 per month in Veteran's Administration disabil-
ity pay, the retiree must waive $300 of the retirement pay in order to receive the
$300 in disability pay.
Where a veteran is "entitled to compensation from both the military [in the
form of retirement pay] and the [Veteran's Administration], he [or she] may not
collect an amount greater than the larger of the two pensions." Chuck Pardue,
Military Disability in a Nutshell, 109 Mil. L. Rev. 149, 180 (1985) (emphasis added)
(citing I.R.C. § 104 (1954)). The retiree is not required to select compensation from
only one of the pensions to which he or she is entitled. Rather, the retiree may
receive a portion of his or her compensation from each pension, "provided that the
total does not exceed the larger of the two pensions." Id. at 180. Therefore, the
gross amount of a retiree's military retirement pay will only be augmented by Vet-
eran's Administration disability compensation where the total amount of disability
pay exceeds the total retirement pay, i.e., disability compensation is the larger of
the two pensions.
20. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
21. Former spouses of military personnel are entitled to up to 50 percent of the
military pension under certain circumstances. When they have been married to a
military member "for a period of 10 years or more during which the member per-
formed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibil-
ity for retired or retainer pay," they may be eligible to receive up to 50 percent of
the military spouse's "disposable retired or retainer pay." 10 U.S.C. §§ 1408(d)(2),
(e)(1) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 555, 104 Stat.
1485 (1990). For the current statute, see Appendix. Former spouses who meet this
criteria are eligible for direct payments from the federal government, provided they
present a state court order granting a portion of the military retiree's disposable
income or retainer pay to the Secretary of the relevant military service. Id. at
§ 1408 (d)(1).
Former spouses who were married to a military member less than 10 years, or
who were married during a period when the military member performed less than
10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired
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This article proposes that FUSFSPA be amended to authorize
division of the gross amount of military pensions as marital prop-
erty upon divorce; that Congress' fiscal concerns, particularly
about "double-dipping" can be addressed without excluding signifi-
cant portions of a former spouse's property; and that Congressional
objectives, e.g., tax benefits for long-term and partially disabled
service retirees, can be achieved where the assessed disability pay
does not exceed 50 percent of the gross pension amount without
excluding a former spouse from retirement pay to which he or she
should be entitled.
Section I of this article discusses the origins of the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, the McCarty decision,22
and general trends with respect to divorce, including the divisibil-
ity of pensions as marital property. Section II addresses the effect
of the Mansell decision 23 and offers a critique of the majority opin-
ion in Mansell.A Section III proposes changes in the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act which would restore the
pension rights of former military spouses to their pre-McCarty
state,2 5 while achieving the ends Congress sought w in enacting
FUSFSPA.
I. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
Congress passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protec-
tion Act in response to two important legal developments. The im-
mediate impetus to the Act was the United States Supreme
Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty.27 The more profound im-
petus, however, stemmed from a combined social and legal devel-
pay, may still benefit from FUSFSPA to the extent that their state considers mili-
tary pensions to be marital property. However, they are not eligible to receive pay-
ments directly from the government.
22. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
23. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
24. Id
25. Most state courts did not divide military pensions as marital property prior
to the McCarty decision. This article assumes that division of military pensions was
a natural development in the law. Prior to McCarty, nine states and the Canal
Zone divided military pensions. Bodenhorn v. Bodenhorn, 567 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.
1978); In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974); Linson v.
Linson, 1 Haw. App. 272, 618 P.2d 748 (1980); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535
P.2d 53 (1975) (over 75 percent of husband's retirement pay was community prop-
erty of spouse); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La. 1975); In re Weaver, 606
S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In re Miller, 37 Mont. 556, 609 P.2d 1185 (1980);
Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976), aff'd, 73 N.J. 464, 375
A.2d 659 (1977); Le Clert v. Le Clert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); In re Vinson,
48 Or. App. 283, 616 P.2d 1180 (1980);
26. See supra notes 7, 8.
27. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
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opment: the staggering increase in divorce rates among the
general population, its severe economic impact on former wives,
and the states' legislative and judicial responses. McCarty would
have created much less public outrage had its effect been less
widespread.
The "Divorce Revolution": Its Economic Consequences, and
Resulting Legal Developments
In the past thirty years, the "institution" of divorce has
changed dramatically. Divorce, once a source of scandal and the
hallmark of disrepute,28 particularly for women, is fast becoming a
"normal" occurrence. In fact, recent indications show divorce to
be almost as common as marriage. In 1985, 2.4 million marriages
commenced-and 1.2 million couples divorced.29 Statisticians cur-
rently predict that half of all marriages will end in divorce.30
While younger couples and individuals who remarry are more
likely to divorce, 31 divorce rates are also rising among older Amer-
icans with long-term marriages. Between 1980 and 1986, the di-
vorce rate among men between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine
increased by 10 percent; the rates for men between age sixty and
age sixty-four, and over age sixty-five, increased 14 percent and 5
percent respectively.3 2 During the same time period, women in
the fifty-five to fifty-nine age range experienced an 8 percent in-
crease in the divorce rate, while rates for those ages sixty to sixty-
four increased by 4 percent and increased 7 percent for those over
28. See Naomi Gerstel, Divorce and Stigma, 34 Soc. Probs. 172 (1987).
29. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 86 (1990). Preliminary reports estimate that 1,183,000 divorces took
place in 1988. Id. at 89.
30. See Teresa C. Martin & Larry L. Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Dis-
ruption, 26 Demography 37 (Feb. 1989).
There is some debate over the manner in which divorce statistics are reported.
Some statisticians now believe that current methods of predicting divorce rates do
not adequately account for the number of marriages which do not end in divorce.
See And Divorce Loses" Divorce Rate Lower Than Believed, Psychology Today,
Sept. 1988, at 8.
31. In 1985, divorce rates in the United States were highest for teenage women,
and men between the ages of twenty and twenty-four. National Center for Health
Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1985, 36 Monthly Vital Statis-
tics Rep. 1 (Supp. Dec. 7, 1987), at 3-4. Considering the duration of the marriage,
the proportion of divorces was highest at two and three years. Id. at 4. Statistics
indicate that six out of ten second marriages are likely to end in divorce. Gary N.
Skoloff, Family Law Section Seeks to Educate, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 6, 1990, at 25.
32. David Larsen, Late Finale. When Long Marriages End, L.A. Times, Jan. 25,
1990, at El, col. 2. Statistics were provided by the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics and are a composite of the 31 states which report divorce statistics for older
Americans. Id.
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age sixty-five.33 Overall, current statistics show a definite increase
in divorces for older women.
The rising divorce rate has contributed to a disturbing mod-
ern phenomenon: the feminization of poverty. One widely quoted
statistic graphically demonstrates the problem: following divorce,
women experience a 73 percent decline in their standard of living,
while their former husbands experience a 42 percent increase in
their standard of living.34 The number of women who fall into the
category of "displaced homemaker"35 continues to rise with the di-
vorce rate. According to census reports, the number of displaced
homemakers increased by over 12 percent between 1980 and
1989.36 During the same time period, the percentage of adult wo-
men classified as displaced homemakers rose from 14.6 percent to
15.8 percent.3 7
Skyrocketing divorce rates have also contributed to another
development in divorce law. As divorce became more socially ac-
ceptable, states moved to "no fault" divorce, a system in which
parties need not allege that one spouse is responsible for the de-
struction of the marriage.38
Ironically, "no fault" divorce has contributed substantially to
the feminization of poverty. Women may now have less "bargain-
ing power" when negotiating a divorce, and certainly tend to be
much worse off financially following divorce.39 Women who are
single parents are particularly vulnerable. About nine out of ten
one-parent families were headed by women in 1987,40 and more
than half of those families were living in poverty.4 ' Between 60
and 65 percent of all poor adults are women.42
33. 1&
34. Lenore J. Weitzman, Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Eco-
nomic Consequences for Women and Children in America 339 (1985).
35. Displaced homemakers are "women who have worked outside the home for
a short time or not at all and have dedicated the best years of their lives to support-
ing their husbands and children." Mary Ann Mason, The Equality Trap 56 (1988).
36. There were 13.9 million "displaced homemakers" in 1980 and 15.6 million in
1989. Tamar Lewin, Data Showing Rising Plight of Displaced Homemakers, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1990, at 13, col. 3.
37. Id.
38. See James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequa. The Economic Disaster of
Divorce for Women and Children, 21 Fain. L.Q. 351 (1987).
39. Id. at 352. See also Weitzman, supra note 34, at 339. But see Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 1103, 1105-07 (1989) (inequita-
ble post-divorce property divisions no more common under no-fault laws than
under traditional models).
40. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Series P-23, No. 163,
Changes in American Family Life 13 (1989).
41. Id. at 25.
42. Martha E. Giminez, The Feminization of Poverty: Myth or Reality?, 17 Soc.
Just. 43, 48 (1990).
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Under "no fault" divorce laws, which are normally written in
gender-neutral terms, the dissolution of a marriage resembles
closely the dissolution of a business partnership. Unfortunately,
most courts award women what amounts to substantially less than
half of the marital assets.4 3 However, because women are now
considered "equal" partners despite disparties in resources and
earning power, courts are also less likely to award long-term ali-
mony.44 All divorced women now have the "right" to go out and
support themselves alone, even if they have no current job skills,
have young children at home, and are unable to afford day care.45
While wages for women have increased, and women continue grad-
ually to narrow the wage gap, working women still only earn 65
percent of men's wage rates.46 The wage differential between men
and women is naturally greater for those women who remove
themselves from the paid labor force to care for homes or fami-
lies.47 Women who have contributed to marital assets in the form
of homemaking skills are clearly not able to retain their standard
of living following divorce. Consequently, older women are partic-
ularly vulnerable to the feminization of poverty.
While courts generally do not reward the "non-income pro-
ducing" contributions of wives with an equal distribution of the
marital assets,46 they are increasingly aware of the economic con-
43. Studies on the economic impact of divorce on women indicate that the no-
fault era has resulted in decreases in alimony and child support awards, and that
women now receive a smaller share of the family assets and a greater share of the
debts. McLindon, supra note 38, at 352.
44. Divorce reform beginning in the 1960s emphasized the use of property divi-
sion rather than alimony as a means of support for the spouse disadvantaged by di-
vorce. Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The
Division of Property to Address Need, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 827, 837-39 (1988).
Although alimony is now awarded infrequently, the courts' tendency to divide
property equally (as opposed to equitably), with little consideration for economic
need, has exacerbated the impact of the reform on women. Id. at 866, 914.
45. See Mason, supra note 35, at 53-54.
46. See id. at 123-34. Recently, this figure has been estimated to be at 70 per-
cent. Id. at 124.
47. See Weitzman, supra note 34, at 331.
48. This inequity probably occurs more often in non-community property states.
However, residence in a community property state provides no guarantee that a for-
mer spouse will receive a respectable share of the income-earning spouse's pension,
even where the pension is considered under state law to be a community asset of
the marriage. See generally Rearden v. Rearden, 568 So. 2d 1111 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(District court awarded former spouse five percent of husband's military retire-
ment benefits accumulated while the couple resided in Missouri, an equitable distri-
bution state); Newman v. Newman, 558 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1990) (wife's claim of
property right in former spouse's military retirement pension governed by the law
of states of domicile of serviceman during the time he was a member of the armed
forces).
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tributions 49 of women who do not work outside the home.50 Con-
sequently, most states regard pensions and other retirement
benefits earned by either spouse as marital assets which may be
distributed upon divorce.5'
The McCarty Decision
In 1981, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether states were permitted to divide military retirement pen-
sions as marital property upon divorce.52 The Court concluded
that state division of military retirement benefits was precluded by
the supremacy clause53 because such division would do "major
damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests."4 The clear
and substantial federal interest identified by the Court was the
need to maintain a "youthful and vigorous" military force.55 The
damage to those interests arose because military retirement bene-
fits are used as an incentive in recruitment and re-enlistment
drives, and "[t]he value of retired pay as an inducement for enlist-
ment or re-enlistment is obviously diminished to the extent that
the service member recognizes that he or she may be involuntarily
transferred to a State that will divide that pay upon divorce."56
The Court found Congress' expressed intent to preclude the
division of military retired pay in the absence of language ex-
pressly permitting the division of retired pay.5 7 Congress promptly
"overruled" the Court, creating a statutory right to divide military
retirement pay,58 and placing military retirement benefits in the
same position as other federally-paid retirement benefits. Federal
Civil Service pensions are currently divisible under state law,59 as
are Foreign Service Pensions,60 Central Intelligence Agency pen-
sions,6' and pensions under the Railroad Retirement Act.6 2
49. Homemakers contribute economically in that they provide services, espe-
cially cleaning, cooking and childcare, that otherwise would have to be paid for at
significant expense. See Mason, supra note 35, at 120-22.
50. See, e.g., Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 381, 376 N.W.2d 839, 844 (1985);
reh'g denied, 127 Wis. 2d 444, 379 N.W.2d 853 (1986).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
53. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
54. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220, 236 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
571, 581).
55. Id. at 234.
56. Id.
57. See id at 237-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. McCarty was decided in 1981. Congress passed FUSFSPA in 1982.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (1988).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,145, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,653 (1979).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 403, Title II § 221 (1988).
62. 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1988).
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II. The Mansell Decision
The Supreme Court revisited the question of dividing mili-
tary benefits in 1989 in Mansell v. ansell.63 Mansell dealt specifi-
cally with the divisibility of Veteran's Administration retirement
disability benefits,64 although it has implications for other items
excluded from disposable pay. For example, for those divorced
before 1991 the following are currently excluded from disposable
pay: a) federal income taxes withheld by federal, state, and local
governments;6 5 b) unpaid federal, state, or local income taxes, or
other tax obligations;66 c) any monies owed by the service member
to the federal government;67 d) child support and maintenance ob-
ligations authorized by court order;68 e) Survivor Benefit Plan6 9
fees, where applicable, i.e., when the former spouse is named as
the beneficiary of the Survivor Benefit Plan and a portion of the
service member's retired or retainer pay is paid to the service
63. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
64. Id.
65. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C) (1988) (amended 1990). Prior to the 1990 amend-
ments, federal income taxes were assessed on the whole amount of the disposable
retirement pay, not on the portions "belonging" to the service member or the for-
mer spouse. Divorce decrees finalized before 1991 remain subject to the original
tax withholding provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C) (1988). Prior to the 1990
amendments, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (a)(4)(C) read: "'Disposable retired or retainer pay'
means the total monthly retired or retainer pay . .. less amounts which are ...
properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax purposes, if the withhold-
ing of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such
amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized if such member
claimed all dependents to which he was entitled ..."
66. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(D) (1988). For decrees finalized before 1991, a ser-
vicemember's withheld income tax and other tax obligations are deducted from the
gross amount of retired or retainer pay. Id. They are not considered disposable re-
tired or retainer pay. Therefore, such a service member's tax obligations reduce
the proportion of retired or retainer pay available to a former spouse as marital
property or in the form of alimony or other support.
The effect of removing portions of retired or retainer pay from disposable re-
tired or retainer pay is discussed in the context of Veteran's Administration disabil-
ity benefits. See supra notes 86-93.
67. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) (1988) (amended 1990).
68. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1988) (amended 1990).
69. The Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) provides an annuity to the service mem-
ber's spouse or former spouse after the military spouse dies. See generally, H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 352, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1080, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). It ensures that, should the military retiree die before his or
her spouse, pension funds will continue to be paid to the beneficiary spouse. l.
Retirees are automatically enrolled in the SBP and may not unilaterally opt out of
the program. Id However, they may, with the consent and signature of the benefi-
ciary spouse, choose not to continue to receive the SBP. Id A small fee is assessed
for those who remain in the program. Following a divorce, a military retiree can-
not unilaterally elect not to pay the Survivor Benefit Plan fees when her or his for-
mer spouse is the named beneficiary of the plan. Id
1991] DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY PEN'SIONS
member's spouse or former spouse pursuant to a court order;70 f)
court-martial fines and fees;71 g) and formerly overpayed pension
amounts.72 The disposable retirement pay is thus reduced by the
amounts deducted at the point of origination. The former spouse
is entitled to up to 50 percent of the disposable income, which is
the retirement pay minus items deducted at the point of
origination.
The Effects of the Mansell Decision on the Rights of
Former Spouses
While the Mansell decision significantly reduces the compen-
sation available to former spouses,73 it has even wider reaching
consequences than first appear. For example, the decision pre-
cludes division of the portion of retirement pay waived to accept a
disability benefit, whether the disability benefit was assessed
before or qfter retirement.7 4
The military disability system makes a number of relevant
distinctions between types of disability. Disability which occurs as
a result of wartime service is assessed differently than disability
which occurs as a result of peacetime service.75 In addition, Vet-
eran's Administration disability7 6 may be assessed for disabilities
which occur as a direct result of military service77 or for pre-ex-
isting conditions 78 which are aggravated by military service.79
70. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(F) (1988) (amended 1990) (redesignated (D)).
71. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1988) (amended 1990).
72. Section 555 of the fiscal 1991 Department of Defense Authorization Bill
amended FUSFSPA to assess federal income tax, state income tax, and monies
owed the federal government against the non-paying spouse responsible for the as-
sessment and not against the pension as a whole. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-510, § 555, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990). Court martial fines and fees remain assessed
against the pension as a whole. Id. This amendment affects only those former
spouses and personnel retiring 90 days after passage of section 555. Id.
73. For example, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of FUSFSPA, Gaye
Mansell (Forbes) lost "nearly 30 percent of the monthly retirement income she
would otherwise have received as community property." Mansell, 490 U.S. at 595
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1981).
75. Pardue, supra note 18, at 165.
76. Veteran's Administration disability is more readily available than regular
service disability, and may be "available upon the expiration of... term of service
without reenlistment or upon retirement.... Army disability benefits [on the
other hand] are intended only for soldiers whose careers are interrupted by service-
incurred or service-aggravated disabilities." Eva Novak, The Army Physical Disa-
bility System, 112 Mil. L. Rev. 273, 277 (1986).
77. Pardue, supra note 19, at 165.
78. Pre-existing conditions are labeled as conditions which "existed prior to ser-
vice" or EPTS. Novak, supra note 76, at 278.
79. Id.
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Claims for Veteran's Administration disability benefits are nor-
mally processed concurrently with retirement from the service.8 O
The Veteran's Administration will also periodically review the re-
tiree "to determine whether a change in the extent of disability
warrants a change in [disability] rating and benefits."8'
Military disability in the form of Veteran's Administration
disability benefits provides an important source of income for re-
tirees. It is awarded, in part, because of the real and perceived
physical hardships of military service. Military disability generally
reflects fitness for active duty, and does not necessarily reflect po-
tential disability, if any, in the civilian job force.8 2 However, Vet-
eran's Administration disability benefits are adjustable and may
take into account the relative fitness of a retiree or other disability
recipient to participate in the civilian work force s.8
The disability benefit offset is also a substantial "perk" of
military service. Since the disability generally offsets, but does not
augment, the retirement income received directly from the United
States government,8 4 it does not facially increase a retiree's in-
come. However, a retiree benefits financially from the receipt of
the disability offset because the portion of the retirement pay re-
labeled as disability pay cannot be taxed as income at the federal,
state, or local level. Consequently, the retiree's after-tax income
will increase even though the total amount of direct pay to which
he or she is entitled has not changed.
Davis v. Davis85 graphically illustrates the problems posed
by changes in disability which occur after pensions are divided in
divorce settlements. In Davis, the military retiree was assessed a
40 percent disability upon retirement, with twenty-six years of ser-
vice in the military.8 6 His retirement pay, based on longevity of
service, was 65 percent of his base pay at retirement.8 7 He was eli-
80. Id. at 283.
81. I&
82. See Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis. 2d 540 463 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (Vietnam-era veteran, with a disability rating of 70 percent, worked for
Chrysler Corporation for 10 years after disability retirement). Many, if not most,
military retirees seek employment in the civilian work force after separation from
the military. Edna J. Hunter, Families Under the Flag. A Review of Military Fam-
ily Literature 79 (1982).
83. See Pardue, supra note 19, at 165.
84. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
85. 777 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1989).
86. Id at 231.
87. "The percentage multiplier [to determine retired pay] is either the total dis-
ability percent rating or 2 1/2 percent of the total years of service .. " Dep't of
Army, Reg. No. 635-40, app. C-12c, Personnel Separations-Physical Evaluation for
Retention, Retirement, or Separation (Dec. 13, 1985 Update) [hereinafter AR 635-
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gible to receive 40 percent of base pay as disability compensation.8
Therefore, he was eligible to receive a total of 65 percent of his
base pay,89 and could elect to receive 40 percent of base pay as dis-
ability, leaving 25 percent of base pay to be collected as disposable
retirement pay. In the years subsequent to his retirement, how-
ever, Mr. Davis's disability rating was increased by the Veteran's
Administration from 40 to 80 percent.9 0 He remained able to re-
cover 65 percent of base pay as retirement pay. However, the in-
crease in his disability rating meant he was now able to receive 75
percent,9 1 the maximum amount allowed, of his base pay at the
time of retirement as disability benefits. Davis's former spouse
therefore was effectively precluded from receiving any portion of
the military pension because the total disability benefit exceeded
the total retirement pay.92
Veteran's Administration disability benefits are fairly readily
available. For example, a retiree with a disability rating of less
than 30 percent who has more than twenty years of active service
for retirement, or less than twenty years of service and a disability
rating of more than 30 percent, will be eligible for Veteran's Ad-
ministration benefits.9 3 Therefore, most career military person-
ne194 will be eligible for some Veteran's Administration benefits.
Consequently, most former spouses of career military retirees are
affected by the Mansell decision.
Mansell acknowledges that "disability benefits are exempt
from federal, state, and local taxation... [and thus] military retir-
ees who waive their retirement pay in favor of disability benefits
increase their after-tax income."9 5 As a result of Mansell, how-
ever, military retirees facing division of their pensions upon di-
vorce are able to significantly increase their retirement pay simply
by relabeling a portion of that retirement pay and pulling the
40]. The multiplier is then applied to base pay. Retired pay/disability may not ex-
ceed 75 percent of base pay at the time of retirement. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Davis, 777 S.W.2d at 231.
91. The multiplier cannot exceed 75 percent of base pay at the time of retire-
ment. AR 635-40.
92. Note that Davis could have elected to receive 10 percent of base pay as disa-
bility, and 65 percent as retirement pay. However, he elected to unilaterally
"rename" his retirement pension as disability pay. Nothing in the Mansell decision
or FUSFSPA prevents a military retiree and his or her former spouse from reach-
ing an agreement which exceeds the statutory guidelines.
93. AR 635-40.
94. Service personnel with 20 or more years of active service are generally con-
sidered "career military personnel."
95. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 583-84. The Court concluded: "Not surprisingly, waiv-
ers of retirement pay are common." I&, at 584.
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funds from the portion of pay which is labeled "disposable
income."
Mansell apparently precludes the division of any of the re-
labeled retirement pay96 and permits the military retiree to defeat
a court-ordered division of the pension. State court decisions in
the pre-Mansell era were divided as to whether or not the retired
military spouse was entitled to defeat such an award. For exam-
ple, a California appellate court ruled that it would not permit the
military spouse to unilaterally destroy his or her former spouse's
marital property rights by opting to receive retirement benefits in
the form of disability, rather than longevity, pay.97 However, an-
other California court reached the opposite result, holding that the
federal statute preempted state domestic relations law.98
Taking Mansell to Task- A Critical View of the Majority
Opinion
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
(FUSFSPA) was originally intended to alleviate the hardships im-
posed on former spouses of military retirees99 by the McCarty de-
cision. Congress enacted FUSFSPA only a year after McCarty,
and many of its provisions were made retroactive to the day before
the decision in McCarty was announced.100 The Court reached its
decision in Mansell by applying a strict textualist variation of stat-
utory analysis.101 The court approached the statute by noting that
FUSFSPA authorizes state courts to treat "disposable retired or
retainer pay" as divisible marital property.102 The majority's anal-
ysis essentially begins and ends with the Act's definition of dispos-
able retired or retainer pay. The term "disposable retired or
retainer pay" means the total monthly retired or retainer pay to
96. See id
97. In re Marriage of Mastropaolo, 166 Cal. App. 3d 953, 213 Cal. Rptr. 26
(1985).
98. In re Marriage of Costo, 156 Cal. App. 3d 781, 203 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1984).
99. Although FUSFSPA is written in gender neutral terms, and presumably ap-
plies to the pensions of male and female military retirees, it is clear that Congress
was concerned primarily with the plight of former military wives. Mansell, 490
U.S. at 593-94 n.18.
100. McCarty was decided on June 26, 1981. When passed, FUSFSPA read "[A]
court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay... after June 25, 1981, either as
property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse ..
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
101. The Court remarked: "We realize that reading the statute literally may in-
flict economic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread the stat-
ute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a reading requires us to do
violence to the plain language of the statute and to ignore much of the legislative
history." Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 584.
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which a military member is entitled "minus certain deductions,"
including "any amounts waived in order to receive disability bene-
fits."103 The court construed the language of the statute to provide
that "state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposa-
ble retired pay as community property; they have not been granted
the authority to treat total retired pay as community property."104
The Court's analysis pattern began with the language of the
statute and then shifted the burden to appellee, Mrs. Gaye Mansell
Forbes, to prove that the Act's legislative history demonstrated
that Congress' intent differed from the literal words of
§ 1408(c)(1).1 05 The Court completely ignored the Act's savings
clause which provided that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member
of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other
payments required by a court order on the grounds that pay-
ments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under
this section have been made in the maximum amount permit-
ted.... Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be
enforced by any means available under law other than the
means provided under this section in any case in which the
maximum amount permitted . .. has been paid .... 106
This clause seems to contemplate judicial discretion in appor-
tioning military retired pay in order to prevent the retiree from
unilaterally displacing a former spouse's interest in the marital
property.
In addition, the Court focused on the state of the law after
McCarty and before FUSFSPA, ignoring the fact that most, if not
all, of FUSFSPA's provisions were meant to be applied retroac-
tively to the day before the McCarty decision.1o" Instead the Court
adopted the position of Major Mansell and the Solicitor General of
103. Id at 585 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1988)).
104. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589. The Court acknowledged that Congress contem-
plated other marital property division schemes. However, the Court addressed the
problems proposed by the Mansell case solely in terms of community property as
the case arose in California, a community property state. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 584
n.2.
105. Id at 592.
106. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6) (1988) (emphasis added). The Court chose to inter-
pret this provision as applying only to the direct payment mechanism included in
the statute.
107. The Court said:
Because pre-existing federal law, as construed by this Court, com-
pletely pre-empted the application of state community property law to
military retirement pay, Congress could overcome the McCarty deci-
sion only by enacting an affirmative grant of authority giving the
States the power to treat military retirement pay as community
property.
Mansell, 490 U.S. at 588.
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the United States: that FUSFSPA is only "a partial rejection of the
McCarty rule that federal law preempts state law regarding mili-
tary retirement pay."10s
The Court placed relatively little importance on FUSFSPA's
primary purpose: "to eliminate the effect of McCarty's pre-emp-
tion holding altogether and to return to the States their authority
'to treat military pensions in the same manner as they treat other
retirement benefits."'1O9 The Senate Report on FUSFSPA clearly
stated that:
IT]he primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the
United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. Mc-
Carty.... The bill would accomplish this objective by permit-
ting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with
the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired
pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a
divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation. 110
Furthermore, FUSFSPA was intended to "remove the federal pre-
emption found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and
permit State and other courts of competent jurisdiction to apply
pertinent State or other laws in determining whether military re-
tired or retainer pay should be divisable [sic].""'
FUSFSPA recognizes that retired military personnel have
the option of receiving a portion of their retirement pension in the
form of disability pay.l12 However, this recognition does not pre-
clude a different scheme of division than that promulgated in the
Mansell decision. FUSFSPA attempts, rather, to reach a "form of
remedial legislation which is fair and equitable to both
spouses.. .113 Congress apparently wished to provide divorced
military retirees access to Veteran's Administration disability ben-
108. See id. It should be noted that the Solicitor General filed two amicus briefs
in the Mansell case. The first brief, filed before the Court noted jurisdiction, was in
support of Mrs. Mansell's position. The Solicitor General abruptly changed his po-
sition on the issue and filed a subsequent brief in support of Major Mansell. Id. at
588 n.8.
109. 1d at 596 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1596, 1604-05). A
number of states divide disability benefits as marital property. See, e.g., Riddle v.
Riddle, 566 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1991); Powers v. Powers, 779 P.2d 91 (Nev.
1989).
110. S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1596, 1599.
111. S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1596, 1611.
112. This article does not address and is not intended to express a position on the
wisdom of providing Veteran's Administration disability to career military service
members upon retirement.
113. S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1596, 1601.
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efits equal to that enjoyed by their counterparts who either never
married or continue to be married.
Congress has traditionally enjoyed the freedom to set or alter
military benefits partly because they are perceived by the courts as
an integral aspect of achieving military personnel objectives. 114
However, Congress considered and rejected the military's argu-
ments concerning possible detrimental effects on the recruiting
and retention of military personnel when they decided to reject
McCarty. The House, in passing FUSFSPA, noted that "[t]he De-
partment of Defense has not submitted any satisfactory empirical
evidence to show that during the period prior to the McCarty [sic]
decision, recruiting, retention, and personnel assignments were ad-
versely affected by the application of State domestic relations
law.""15 In fact, the legislative record of FUSFSPA indicates that
recognition and respect for the role of military spouses as home-
makers, mothers, and companions actually enhances national de-
fense."l6 The only factor considered more important in a service
member's decision to re-enlist than the amount of pay and imme-
diate benefits is the attitude and support of the service member's
spouse.117
In reaching the decision in Mansell, however, the Supreme
Court ignored Congress' rejection of the "military necessity" argu-
ment and implied that it was returning to just that analysis."l 8
The Court's reluctance to apply well established principles of law
to the military, under the premise that the military itself is best
suited to regulate such matters, is particularly distressing in light
of the limited, and perhaps detrimental, effect on personnel re-
cruitment which might be attributed to limitations on the pension
rights of former military spouses. The military, it seems, is enti-
tled to take advantage of the recruiting and retention benefits,
made possible by dedicated military spouses without compensating
them for their contribution.
114. See McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 232-35 (1981).
115. 128 Cong. Rec. H18,315 (1982) (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder).
116. S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1596, 1601. ("[Tihe committee believes that the unique status of the
military spouse and that spouse's great contribution to our defense require that the
status of the military spouse be acknowledged, supported and protected.") Military
family members are considered to accept and to be "devoted to the overall mission
of the Department of Defense...." H.R.J. Res. 566, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.; 136 Cong.
Rec. H10,349 (1990).
117. See Gloria Lauer Grace & Mary B. Steiner, Wives'Attitudes and the Reten-
tion of Navy Enlisted Personnel, in Military Families 42-54 (Edna J. Hunter & D.
Stephen Nice, eds. 1978).
118. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 584.
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The Case for Former Spouses. Mansell's Inherent
Inequality
The military family is a relatively new phenomenon. While
the military members in 1891119 were overwhelmingly single men,
the military of today is composed of both men and women,'= most
of whom are married. In fact, 52 percent of all active duty enlisted
military personnel and 72 percent of all active duty military of-
ficers are married.12 1 Dependent military family members cur-
rently outnumber uniformed service members.22
This change in military demographics led to another develop-
ment: military divorces. Traditionally the military family has had
a much lower divorce rate than civilian families. Many military
families are changing, however, just as families in society in gen-
eral have been changing.123 Military marriages are subject to the
same social forces as civilian marriages. The rapid increase in di-
vorce rates in the last twenty-five years has not bypassed the mili-
tary family. In fact, the national divorce rate 24 doubled between
1963 and 1975, and peaked in 1981 at 1.21 million divorces. The
rising divorce rate has hit military families even harder than civil-
ian families: the divorce rate among veterans is slightly higher
than among their civilian counterparts. 126
Military spouses are subject to stresses which their civilian
counterparts rarely face.' 17 Military families are subject to fre-
quent relocation to remote and, occasionally, hazardous duty sta-
tions. They also face long periods of separation from the military
service member. Duty assignments away from home average
twenty-five days per year in the United States Air Force.28 Due
to frequent duty assignments, at any given time 15 to 20 percent of
military fathers are not living with their families.2 9 Conse-
quently, military spouses often spend more time than their civilian
119. The military retirement system was initiated in 1891.
120. See 135 Cong. Rec. E2,753-57 (daily ed. July 31, 1989).
121. 133 Cong. Rec. S12,834 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987).
122. See text accompanying supra note 10.
123. Edna J. Hunter, Families Under the Flag. A Review of Military Family
Literature 4 (1982).
124. Divorce rate statistics are for all marriages, both civilian and military.
125. Weitzman, supra note 34, at xvii.
126. Larry Long, Military Families: Do They Differ From Their Civilian Coun-
terparts 15 (1984) (Center for Demographic Studies, U.S. Bureau of the Census).
127. Florence W. Kaslow & Richard I. Ridenour, The Military Family: Dynamics
and Treatment 53 (1984).
128. Dennis K. Orthner, Families in Blue: A Study of Married and Single Parent
Families in the U.S. Air Force 43 (1980) (Family Research and Analysis, Inc.).
129. Edna J. Hunter & Melissa A. Pope, Family Roles in Transition: In a Chang-
ing Military 11 (1981).
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counterparts bearing full responsibility for maintaining the family
and home.
The frequent moves and extensive parenting responsibilities
of military spouses affects, to a devastating degree, the employ-
ment and educational attainment of military spouses. Conse-
quently, military spouses have a lowered ability to accrue pensions,
benefits, and occupational skills.130 Military wives have an unem-
ployment rate twice that of civilian wives.131 'The proportion of
[income-earning] military wives [decreases] with [the] increasing
rank or rate of the husband ... ,"132 Those who are employed are
more likely than their civilian counterparts to be employed in cler-
ical or service occupations. 133 They are also likely to earn substan-
tially less than civilian wives who work outside the home. Military
wives at all age groups were also more likely to have no earn-
ings,' 3 4 and military wives of all ages were much less likely than
civilian wives to contribute $10,000 or more to the average family
income.138
Those wives who do manage to find work face other
problems. Frequent transfers "lead to loss of salary, fringe bene-
fits and seniority rights on the job."136 In addition, skilled and ed-
ucated spouses may be prevented from finding employment
"because of the lack of uniformity in state licensing and certifica-
tion requirements." 3 7 Those spouses are forced to requalify for
employment with each of the member's transfers. 3 8 Finally, po-
tential employers may view military spouses as temporary employ-
ees because of the transient nature of military life.'3 9
Military spouses are less likely to earn outside income during
their marriage to a military member.140 "Typically the military
wife, unlike the civilian wife, shares her husband's occupation to a
greater extent, while concurrently maintaining her stereotypic
family responsibilities. The military wife has . .. more roles to
perform, more demands on her time, and more sole responsibility
130. See generally Hunter, supra note 123, at 23 (1982).
131. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 125.
132. Hunter, supra note 123, at 18.
133. 135 Cong. Rec. E2 753-57 (daily ed. July 31, 1989)(remarks of Rep. Patricia
Schroeder).
134. Long, supra note 126, at 29.
135. Id.
136. Hunter, supra note 123, at 23.
137. Id at 23-24.
138. Id. at 24.
139. Id.
140. This may be changing, however. The Washington Post reported that 44 per-
cent of officers' wives work outside the home. Molly Moore, Commanders Barred
From Interfering in Military Spouses Careers, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1987, at A6.
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for sole decision making."141 They are also more likely to have an
education below the level of their spouses.142 If they do work
outside the home,143 it is unlikely they will find well-paying
employment.
Military wives, however, face an additional pressure which
their civilian counterparts rarely encounter. They are pressured
by the military not to take outside employment. This is especially
true of officers' wives, who have been told that, by taking outside
employment, they will harm their husbands' chances for promo-
tion.144 Evaluations of a member's wife have become part of his
service record.145 One of the most blatant incidents occurred in
1987 at Grissom Air Force Base, where the base commander in-
formed the wives of several officers that their husbands would not
be promoted if they continued to work.146 While such blatant
threats are rare, a great deal of anecdotal evidence147 suggests that
working wives, or wives who are considering outside employment,
continue to be pressured by lower ranking members of base com-
mand or commanders' wives.14s These women are often obliquely
or overtly threatened with denial of their husbands' promotions if
they fail to comply and continue in or accept outside employ-
ment.149 Military spouses are instead encouraged to provide gratu-
itous labor and to support volunteer activities essential to the
military community. The volunteer organizations military spouses
are expected to support include: the Officers' Wives Clubs, the Red
Cross, thrift shops, civilian and military hospitals, and military
141. Hunter, supra note 123, at 9-10.
142. Id. at 26.
143. "mhe military wife has traditionally been involved with her husband's ca-
reer as a firm priority, above personal and family interests, much more than a civil-
ian wife.... [I]t is apparent that the [military] institution places demands on both
marital partners.... The wife is unpaid and unseen labor. Unfortunately, the
wife's commitment to her military wife role and the mobility associated with the
military lifestyle usually result in her inability to pursue her own occupational
goals." Id. at 11.
144. 133 Cong. Rec. S12,834-35 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987). Despite the results of
investigations into this practice, commanders involved were not disciplined. Of-
ftrer's Wives Told They Should Quit Jobs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at B6, col. 1.
Prohibitions against compelling military wives to participate in volunteer activities
and against including a member's wife's lack of volunteer activity in service mem-
ber evaluations are located in 32 C.F.R. §§ 105.1-105.6 (1990).
145. 133 Cong. Rec. S12,834-36 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987).
146. For a discussion of the Grissom Air Force Base story, and letters to the edi-
tor of Air Force Times who printed an article about the situation, see 133 Cong.
Rec. S12,835-36 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987).
147. See id.
148. Commanders' wives are often charged with responsibility for the success of
base-wide volunteer activities and organizations. See 133 Cong. Rec. S12,834-35
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987).
149. Id.
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family support services.150 Given their frequent relocations, lower
education levels, the propensity to work in clerical or service occu-
pations, and the systemic pressure not to work outside the home, it
is not surprising that many former spouses emerge from long mar-
riages with no social security or pension benefits of their own. In
addition, these women face the same pressures which other long-
term homemakers encounter when trying to re-enter the work
force following divorce. Displaced homemakers and other older
women are rarely, if ever, able to achieve the income level to
which they were accustomed (prior to becoming divorced or wid-
owed) through their own employment efforts.151
The spouses of military retirees deserve military pensions not
only as security to which they are entitled as a result of the dura-
tion of their marriage to military personnel, but also as an earned
asset by virtue of their unique service to the Armed Services. The
time and effort they expend as primary caretakers of the military
home and family, as well as the additional contribution of volun-
teer services, contribute substantially to the character and opera-
tion of the modern military force. Continued denial of substantial
marital assets accrued during military service is indefensible.
Clearly, FUSFSPA must be amended.
III. Amending FUSFSPA: A Proposed Course of Action
In deciding Mansell, the Supreme Court invited Congress to
amend FUSFSPA,152 just as they left Congress free to amend their
decision in McCarty.l53 Congress can, and should, amend FUSF-
SPA to preserve the military retiree's right to elect to receive Vet-
eran's Administration disability benefits and to ensure that former
spouses receive the portion of the military pensions which they
have earned and deserve.
The most rational course of action for Congress to take is to
amend FUSFSPA so that state courts are free to assign up to 50
percent of the original retired pay to the former spouse. This
would be assessed in the following manner: courts would start
with the total amount of retired pay, which may be prorated ac-
cording to years of marriage coinciding with years of service, to
which the retiree was entitled, whether or not the retiree elected
to take the full amount of retired pay as retired pay at the time of
retirement. The state court would then divide the original amount
150. See generally 133 Cong. Rec. S12,835 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1987).
151. See Mason, supra note 35, at 193-94; Weitzman, supra note 34, at 331.
152. Mansell, 490 U.S. 594.
153. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 235-36.
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of retired pay according to state law guidelines or rules concerning
the division of pensions. The former spouse would then receive
the pension labeled as retired pay. The military retiree could then
elect to offset the remaining retired pay with the Veteran's Ad-
ministration disability benefits to which he or she is entitled. For-
mer spouses would not be entitled to any disability benefits which
are granted in addition to (i.e., not as an offset to) the original
amount of retired pay.
A suggested approach for such an amendment is to amend 10
U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) to read:
Disposable retired pay is the total monthly retired pay to
which a member is entitled. Disposable retired pay for pur-
poses of division under this Act includes amounts waived by a
member to receive disability benefits but is limited to the orig-
inal amount of retired pay. Former spouses shall receive re-
tired pay only in the form of retired pay. Members may
receive remaining retired pay in the form of retired pay or dis-
ability benefits to which they are otherwise entitled.
Disability offsets would remain available to military retirees
on the following basis: the military retiree would retain the right
to receive the larger of the two pension amounts, either disability
or retired pay. The retiree could then elect to re-label the portion
of retired pay (or a portion of the portion) as Veteran's Adminis-
tration disability pay. The military member could not receive an
amount more than the larger of the two pensions minus the por-
tion assigned to the former spouse.
Courts would remain free to divide pensions, or not to divide
pensions, based on the abilities and resources of the parties. This
proposed amendment would not mandate division where a mem-
ber is completely disabled or is otherwise unable to maintain a rea-
sonable and equitable standard of living.
Conclusion
This proposal would ensure that former spouses receive the
treatment and consideration which FUSFSPA was originally in-
tended to provide up to half of the retired pay earned during their
marriage to a military member. It would fairly and adequately
provide disability benefits, and their accompanying tax breaks, to
career military members. Because larger portions of retired pay
might remain labeled as retired pay (the portion to which the for-
mer spouse is entitled), federal, state and local revenues from in-
come taxes could increase. Finally, it would prevent military
retirees from unilaterally reducing or obliterating the funds to
which their former spouses are entitled.
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The landscape of divorce law changed to permit the fair and
equitable distribution of pensions, often the most important mari-
tal asset. It is long past time to amend FUSFSPA and place mili-
tary pensions back where they belong- as accessible marital assets
in the state courts.
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Appendix
§ 1408. Payment of retired pay in compliance with court orders
(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) The term "Court" means-
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Is-
lands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands;
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in sec-
tion 451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction;
and
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign
country with which the United States has an agree-
ment requiring the United States to honor any court
order of such country.
(2) The term "court order" means a final decree of di-
vorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation is-
sued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or
approved property settlement incident to such a decree
(including a final decree modifying the terms of a pre-
viously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annul-
ment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such previ-
ously issued decree), which-
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the juris-
diction of that court;
(B) provides for-
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section
462(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
662(b)));
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section
462(c) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
662(c)));
(iii) division of property (including a division of
community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically
provides for the payment of an amount, expressed in
dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay,
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from the disposable retired pay of a member to the
spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree from which
no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has
been taken within the time allowed for taking such ap-
peals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been taken and
such appeal has been finally decided under the laws ap-
plicable to such appeals.
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" means the total
monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less
amounts which-
(A) are owed by that member to the United States
for previous overpayments of retired pay and for re-
coupments required by law resulting from entitle-
ment to retired pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such mem-
ber as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered
by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of re-
tired pay required by law in order to receive compen-
sation under title 5 or title 38;
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay
under chapter 61 of this title, are equal to the
amount of retired pay of the member under that
chapter computed using the percentage of the mem-
ber's disability on the date when the member was re-
tired (or the date on which the member's name was
placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election under chap-
ter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse
or a former spouse to whom payment of a portion of
such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to
a court order under this section.
(5) The term "member" includes a former member en-
titled to retired pay under section 1331 of this title.
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" means the
husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respec-
tively, of a member who, on or before the date of a
court order, was married to that member.




(c) Authority for court to treat retired pay as property of
the member and spouse.
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court
may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member
for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as
property solely of the member or as property of the
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat
retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or
partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the
property of the member and the member's spouse or
former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution,
annulment, or legal separation (including a court or-
dered, ratified, or approved property settlement inci-
dent to such decree) affecting the member and the
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was issued
before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve
jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay of the
member as property of the member and the member's
spouse or former spouse.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, this
section does not create any right, title, or interest
which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise
disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or
former spouse. Payments by the Secretary concerned
under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with
respect to a division of retired pay as the property of a
member and the member's spouse under this subsec-
tion may not be treated as amounts received as retired
pay for service in the uniformed services.
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a
member to apply for retirement or retire at a particu-
lar time in order to effectuate any payment under this
section.
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of
a member in the manner described in paragraph (1)
unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by
reason of (A) his residence, other than because of mili-
tary assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of
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the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the
court.
(d) Payments by Secretary concerned to spouse or for-
mer spouse.
(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned
of a court order providing for the payment of child sup-
port or alimony or, with respect to a division of prop-
erty, specifically providing for the payment of an
amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to
the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Sec-
retary shall make payments (subject to the limitations
of this section) from the disposable retired pay of the
member to the spouse or former spouse in an amount
sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and al-
imony set forth in the court order and, with respect to
a division of property, in the amount of disposable re-
tired pay specifically provided for in the court order.
In the case of a member entitled to receive retired pay
on the date of the effective service of the court order,
such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after
the date of effective service. In the case of a member
not entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the ef-
fective service of the court order, such payments shall
begin not later than 90 days after the date on which
the member first becomes entitled to receive retired
pay.
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments
are to be made under this section was not married to
the member for a period of 10 years or more during
which the member performed at least ten years of ser-
vice creditable in determining the member's eligibility
for retired pay, payments may not be made under this
section to the extent that they include an amount re-
sulting from the treatment by the court under subsec-
tion (c) of disposable retired pay of the member as
property of the member or property of the member
and his spouse.
(3) Payments under this section shall not be made
more frequently than once each month, and the Secre-
tary concerned shall not be required to vary normal
pay and disbursement cycles for retired pay in order to
comply with a court order.
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay of a
member pursuant to this section shall terminate in ac-
cordance with the terms of the applicable court order,
but not later than the date of the death of the member
or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse
to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs
first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides
for a division of property (including a division of com-
munity property) in addition to an amount of child
support or alimony or the payment of an amount of
disposable retired pay as the result of the court's treat-
ment of such pay under subsection (c) as property of
the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned
shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section)
from the disposable retired pay of the member to the
spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of
the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse
under the division of property upon effective service of
a final court order of garnishment of such amount
from such retired pay.
(e) Limitations
(1) The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a
member payable under all court orders pursuant to
subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such dis-
posable retired pay.
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